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"It is an ill wind that blows no good," my Irish great-grandmother would
have replied if asked whether the New Private Law is always and only conser-
vative. Martha Ertman explores a particularly intriguing aspect of this ques-
tion: the progressive potential of the New Private Law in enforcing lesbian
and gay cohabitation contracts at a time when every state denies legal validity
to lesbian and gay marriages, and many still criminalize sodomy. In Georgia,
for example, lesbian and gay marriages have no legal effect, and sodomy,
understood as all-and only-same-sex sexual intimacy, is a crime.' Yet the
Georgia Supreme Court has enforced a lesbian cohabitation contract in which
neither the majority nor the dissent mentioned either "lesbian" or "cohabita-
tion."2
Ertman describes this phenomenon in the context of a broader landscape
in which the legal system swings from public condemnation to privatization to
public rights and back again in regulating various kinds of sexual conduct. She
presents private ordering-legal enforcement of private contracts-as a "way
station" between the extremes of public condemnation (criminalization) and
public rights (constitutional or civil rights independent of contract).
My comments begin with Ertman's explanations of why this might be so.
Part I discusses Ertman's suggestion that this phenomenon (contract's serving
as a way station for lesbian and gay rights) indicates that contract is not, in
general, as conservative as is usually assumed. Part II addresses Ertman's
suggestion that contracts are such a way station because a court can enforce a
contract without indicating approval of it, thus providing "a route to skirting"
moral rhetoric.3
* Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. B.A.,
Loyola University of Chicago, 1969; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1980. 1 thank par-
ticipants in the Denver University Law Review Symposium on The New Private Law for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this essay and my partner Joanne Trapani. I also thank Paul
Bryan, Shirley Evans, Connie Fleischer, Jacqueline Guynn, Ruth Halibey, Carol Jones, Kortney
Kloppe, Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Amy Mayer, Beth Mitchell, William Schwesig, and Charles Ten
Brink for research and other assistance. Research support was provided by the Jerome S. Weiss
Faculty Research Fund and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund.
1. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sod-
omy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
2. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
3. Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
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My comments in Parts I and II are related: both concern the quality of
various sexual relationships. Part I explores differences between heterosexual
and same-sex relationships with respect to the ability of contract to be progres-
sive. I suggest that because a number of differences exist between bargaining
conditions for individuals involved in heterosexual relationships compared to
those in same-sex relationships, contract will generally not be progressive for
"have-nots" (mostly women) in heterosexual couples. Furthermore, the pro-
gressive potential that contract offers same-sex couples may be only tempo-
rary. Once we win the right to marry, our contracts may become more like
those of heterosexuals-waivers of rights by the economically weaker party.
Part II discusses what constitutes good or bad sexual relationships. I argue
that contract's avoidance of moral issues severely limits its progressive poten-
tial. We need to begin to think about the morality of various kinds of sexual
relationships. I propose, therefore, that we consider as one important factor the
extent to which the autonomy of the sexual object is denied. From this per-
spective, heterosexual relationships tend to be far more troubling than same-
sex relationships.
I. PROGRESSIVE CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
Professor Ertman asserts that contract may not (generally) be "as danger-
ous for have-nots as is commonly thought."4 Whether contract is dangerous
for have-nots depends on the relative power of the contracting parties vis-A-vis
each other in terms of countless factors: the parties' power, money, aggres-
siveness, negotiating skills, social expectations, and self-confidence, together
with their comfort level in bargaining in the particular situation, ability to
control terms, alternatives to the contract, and the extent to which each
"needs" the contract. Heterosexual have-nots (usually women) and same-sex
have-nots are in quite different positions with respect to these key factors. In
the discussion that follows I explore some of the reasons why cohabitation or
marital contracts are much less likely to be progressive for have-nots in het-
erosexual relationships than for lesbians and gay men.
A. Bargaining Differences Between Heterosexual and Same-Sex Couples
1. Heterosexual Male Entitlement
Heterosexual men begin the bargaining process from a better position than
either partner in a same-sex couple. Men are likely to be better bargainers in
heterosexual relationships because only they (and not their partners) expect to
enjoy those things heterosexual men generally enjoy in relationships with
women and wives. Gender does not differentiate one member of a same-sex
couple from the other the way it differentiates husband and wife. On a
systemic basis, differences or perceived differences between women and men
are social advantages for men and disadvantages for women. The husband is
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
4. Id. at 1150.
5. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW
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likely to be older, taller, a higher wage earner, and raised to be assertive with
the expectation of male heterosexual privilege: he will be the primary
breadwinner and even if his wife works, she will be the primary caretaker of
their home, their children, and himself. He will have the right to her home-
making and sexual services.
Many wives share these understandings. Indeed, for a woman raised in a
society in which the role of sex in marriage is regarded as essential to the
fulfillment of women as women and men as men, even imagining a more
balanced relationship is difficult. Negotiating for it would sour many relation-
ships and, even if an equitable bargain were reached in the abstract, it would
be of little practical importance. Unless both partners are continuously willing
to fight their own and their partners' inevitable and frequent tendency to slip
into sex roles, their relationship will not be one of equality. Few men seem
genuinely interested in such relationships and few women have the stamina or
power to insist on such a relationship day after day.6
True, in same-sex couples, there may be many disparities: age, height,
beauty, wealth, etc. But these will not be as likely to consistently favor one
partner, and will not favor the one with a sense of heterosexual male entitle-
ment to his wife's services, since both are either men or women. Nor will the
other partner expect to play the role of wife to a "man" with this sense of
entitlement. Even in a same-sex relationship with a fair amount of role play-
ing, these points hold. Neither partner is likely to have the sense of entitlement
vis-A-vis the other which is associated with heterosexual male privilege. Nor
will either expect the other partner to find fulfillment in service to others as a
"wife" and the mother of a man's children. Lesbian couples are particularly
likely to be committed to equality and to ignore economic disparities in the
distribution of power within the relationship.7
2. Relative Commitment to Marriage and Children
Although marriage generally improves men's happiness more than
women's,8 women are socialized to place a higher value on committed inti-
mate relationships and children than men do. Women's greater dedication to
family life places women at a distinct disadvantage in bargaining over the
terms of any marital or cohabitation contract. Since women tend to want long-
32-45 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117-18
(1979).
6. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVO-
LUTION AT HOME (1989) (discussing a study of couples with two working parents and children
under six). Hochschild finds that although many middle class couples maintain that they have an
equal relationship, in fact the women in these relationships do most of the work of the "second
shift," i.e., the work done at home, including child care. Women are more interested than men in
changing traditional roles but are unable to maintain sufficient pressure over time to force such
change.
7. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 53-
56 (1983).
8. Women are twice as likely to be depressed as men, and married women are more de-
pressed than single women or married men. Full-time homemakers are particularly likely to be
depressed. Hope Landrine, Depression and Stereotypes of Women: Preliminary Empirical Analyses
of the Gender-Role Hypothesis, 19 SEX ROLES 527, 528 (1988).
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term relationships and children more, women are likely to settle for less favor-
able contract terms than they would insist on were they no more interested
than men in such relationships and children.' Note that in most heterosexual
couples this disparity will weaken the woman, the partner already systemically
disadvantaged by the gender- and sex-linked differences discussed above.
In same-sex couples, there are either two women or two men, making it
less likely that one partner has been socialized more than the other to value
committed relationships and children more highly. Furthermore, any differ-
ences in commitment are more likely (than those in heterosexual couples) to
cut in different directions from each other (one partner may be more commit-
ted to the relationship; the other to children) or from other factors (who earns
more money), and in any event will not exacerbate the hierarchy created by
sex and gender.
3. Comfort Level with Contracting in this Situation
Overall and on average, men are likely to feel more entitled to bargain for
favorable terms than women because they are likely to be economically stron-
ger than their partners. Not only does our culture generally value wealth and
the wealthy more than other cultures, it also regards the ability to keep one's
earnings as an essential component of personal freedom. Thus, the higher
wage-earning partner-typically the man with all the other sex and gender
advantages that come with being a man in our culture-is more likely to feel
entitled to bargain for terms "protecting" his property, whereas his partner is
likely to feel that she has no equal right to economic protection should the
couple split up.
Women may also tend to be less effective bargainers because women, to a
greater degree than men (on the average), may define themselves as "giving
selves" rather than as "liberal selves."' As giving selves, many women de-
fine their wants in terms of others' needs rather than their own. To the extent
men are more likely (on average) to behave as autonomous liberal selves, men
will have an advantage in bargaining.
Some women are particularly ineffective bargainers in relationships with
men because of the lessons internalized as a result of unwanted sex, such as a
weakened sense of autonomy." For women in some multicultural and reli-
gious communities, the difficulty of bargaining for rights in a heterosexual re-
lationship may seem unimaginable given cultural traditions even more insistent
on female deference to male authority than in many secular or mainstream
communities.
9. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 71-72 (1988).
10. Robin West contrasts the traditional liberal, selfish, rational, and independent self with
the "giving" self: "many women, much of the time, consent to transactions, changes, or situations
in the world so as to satisfy not their own desires or to maximize their own pleasure, but to maxi-
mize the pleasure and satiate the desires of others." Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Theory, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 93
(1987).
11. For a discussion of these harms, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
1172 [Vol. 73:4
PRIVATIZATION OF HETEROSEXUALITY
In contrast, in same-sex couples, one partner may earn more than the
other," but that partner will not as often also enjoy the gender- and sex-relat-
ed advantages as that of a man in a heterosexual couple. Finally, as discussed
in greater detail in Part II, unwanted sex is disproportionately a heterosexual
phenomenon; lesbians and gay men are therefore far less likely to have
internalized its lessons.
4. Alternatives to Contract
For heterosexual couples, there is an alternative to contract: family laws
will apply if they marry. The very availability of this alternative affects what
kind of contracts heterosexuals are likely to enter. For heterosexual couples
who marry, the alternative to contract is a set of state-made terms that tend to
give homemakers and caretakers some protection. In part because this level of
protection is legally imposed upon marriage (at least in the absence of a con-
tract to the contrary), the economically vulnerable partner may feel that asking
for more in a marital contract would be greedy and inappropriate or that bar-
gaining in this situation would be inconsistent with romance. And a cohabiting
heterosexual could have the option of marrying if they both agree that the
weaker party should have these protections. One would not, therefore, expect
many such couples to sign written agreements providing greater or equal pro-
tection for the homemaker.
Precisely because same-sex couples do not have the alternative of legally
recognized marriage and divorce protections, they are more likely (than hetero-
sexual couples) to bargain explicitly for formal contract terms to ensure pro-
tection of the more economically vulnerable party, including terms for the
sharing of resources upon separation or death. Given the alternative, such a
bargain is not looked at as inconsistent with love and romance but as motivat-
ed by such feelings. And in any bargaining, both partners are the same sex.
One partner does not have the advantage of belonging to the privileged sex
while the other suffers the disadvantages described above.
B. Differences in the Contracts of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Couples
Both anecdotal evidence and contracts described in litigated cases support
my conclusion that same-sex and heterosexual partnership contracts are likely
to be quite different in terms of their substantive provisions. 3 Among hetero-
sexual couples, generally only couples who are about to marry seek explicit
contracts. Most such contracts protect the economically stronger (and/or previ-
ously married) party and consist of waivers of rights that would otherwise
accrue to the economically weaker party with marriage. 4 In contrast, explicit
12. For most lesbian couples, this problem appears to be eliminated by the strong commit-
ment to equality regardless of economic power. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7.
13. Compare, for example, Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (written cohabita-
tion contract between lesbians giving rights to economically weaker party) with Simeone v.
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (written pre-marital contract consists of waiver of rights by
economically weaker party).
14. Sometimes the protection is primarily for the benefit of the economically stronger party's
1996] 1173
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cohabitation contracts do occur between same-sex couples, and these are likely
to provide more favorable terms to the economically weaker party than that
party would otherwise obtain (given, of course, that a same-sex couple cannot
marry into the protections of divorce law).
Thus far, I have suggested that although Ertman is right in noting the
progressive potential of partnership contracts for same-sex couples, that same
progressive potential is absent in most heterosexual partnership contracts for
two reasons. First, for the many reasons described above, the two members of
a heterosexual couple are more likely than a same-sex couple to have unequal
bargaining power, giving the economically stronger party a great deal of con-
trol over the contract. Second, the two members of a heterosexual couple bar-
gain in the shadow of family law rules which apply to marriage (in the ab-
sence of a contract); whereas the same-sex couple bargains in the shadow of a
legal regime that gives no economic protection to either partner other than
claims based on economic contributions to property titled only in one person's
name. Thus, when same-sex couples fail to contract there is no court-ordered
sharing of resources under marriage-like rules. There are no applicable rules
other than the general presumption that property is owned by the title holder 5
and the assumption that if property has been acquired with economic contribu-
tions from both, both own some share of the property. 6 For these reasons,
enforcement of cohabitation/marital contracts is likely today to be generally
progressive for same-sex couples but regressive for heterosexual couples.
Although one could impose different rules on same-sex and heterosexual
couples, 7 such a line may well be effective only as long as same-sex couples
are denied the right to legal marriage. Once same-sex couples are allowed to
marry, they too will bargain in the shadow of rules that would give significant
protections to the economically weaker party. Same-sex contracts might then
look quite different, even though same-sex couples would continue to be mem-
bers of the same sex and thus avoid the systemic skewing of power in favor of
the partner born male.
In the short term, however, courts will not apply differential rules to
same-sex and heterosexual couples. Traditionally, courts have refused to en-
force all cohabitation contracts (because they are based in part on "meretri-
cious"'8 relationships), 9 as well as all contracts entered into during marriage
(since the couple was already married, there could be no consideration for
children by a previous marriage, ensuring that their inheritance will not go to a new spouse.
15. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (when unmarried heterosexuals split
up, property owned by the man not divided).
16. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEST, PROBLEMS 818-23 (2d ed. 1991).
17. For example, one could hold that contracts between unmarried or married heterosexuals
had to be at least as generous to the economically weaker partner as family law rules on divorce
in order to be enforceable, whereas contracts between same-sex couples are presumptively en-
forceable absent evidence of unfairness, overreaching, etc.
18. "Of the nature of unlawful sexual connection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed.
1990).




such a contract)." Additionally, courts have applied a very high standard of
fairness to pre-marital contracts, refusing to enforce such contracts in many,
perhaps most, litigated cases.2 Today, courts have become much more will-
ing to enforce heterosexual contracts in each of these situations,22 and have
therefore become willing to enforce same-sex cohabitation contracts. Were it
not for the increased willingness of courts to enforce heterosexual contracts, I
doubt that there would be much chance of enforcing contracts in same-sex
cases. Thus, the regressive reality for heterosexual women comes with, indeed
makes possible, the progressive potential of the New Private Law for same-sex
couples.
True, as Ertman illustrates with the example of the New Private Law's
enforcement of same-sex cohabitation contracts, the New Private Law is not
always and only bad for have-nots. But her example involves contracts be-
tween have-nots of the same sex denied the right to marry. Overall, the force
of the New Private Law's enforcement of contracts in intimate relationships is
regressive, hurting many have-nots, chiefly heterosexual women. Also, when
same-sex couples do obtain the right to marry, whether our contracts will
continue to be progressive is unknown. On balance and over the long term, the
New Private Law probably does more harm than good from the perspective of
have-nots even in the area of cohabitation and marriage contracts.
Ertman discusses a second reason for the progressive potential of the New
Private Law in enforcing same-sex cohabitation contracts. Contract enforce-
ment (like free speech in constitutional law) gives decision makers the ability
to afford some legal protection to same-sex couples without necessarily "ap-
proving" of their "life style." Part II discusses the limits of such tactics and
suggests an alternative approach.
II. MORAL OBJECTIONS TO MALE HETEROSEXUALITY
Ertman is clearly right when she states that many heterosexuals are more
comfortable protecting lesbians and gay men when they can do so without
indicating approval of lesbian and gay relationships. Ertman herself, however,
would probably agree with me that we must ultimately address the "merits" of
lesbian and gay relationships if we are to achieve equal acceptance and re-
spect. I doubt that we will be able to obtain even formal legal equality without
talking about what is good about our relationships. To the extent that what
makes heterosexuals uncomfortable is a distaste for our sexual intimacy, the
feelings underlying opposition to lesbian and gay rights cannot be addressed
without talking about the merits of our relationships.23
20. Id. at 301-02.
21. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 676-82.
22. See CLARK, supra note 19, at 301-02; ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 676-82.
23. See, e.g., URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY & LESBI-
AN LIBERATION 191-95 (1995) (making a similar point, "[tlo win against the right wing, we have
to fight back on the sexual battleground, not run away"). Id. at 192. But see Mary A. Case, Cou-
ples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbi-
an and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993) (arguing that it is "coupling" ["copulation"] that
makes many uncomfortable with lesbian and gay fights and increased emphasis on either coupling
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Many Americans believe that heterosexual relationships are morally supe-
rior to same-sex relationships and hence only the former are entitled to the
sanction and legitimation of state-recognized marriage. Demonizing homosexu-
al relationships and idealizing heterosexual relationships is one way in which
heterosexually-identified women and men project all that is harmful or trou-
bling in their own relationships onto another group, rather than facing and
addressing their own sexual immorality. In reality, many heterosexual relation-
ships are abusive. Many lack real emotional intimacy and mutually desired
physical intimacy. In this section, I discuss one important aspect of what
makes relationships "good" or "bad"-whether one of the partners is
objectified in an autonomy-denying manner. Along this metric, heterosexual
relationships in our culture are more troubling than same-sex relationships.
A. Objectification
To make this point, I begin with the word "objectification," often used but
seldom defined in contemporary discussions of sexuality. Literally,
"objectification" means treating another as a thing, an object, a means to one's
own ends. "Objectification" is not synonymous with any and all relationships
which serve a function in one's life, in which one "gets" something, such as
pleasure or entertainment or emotional or other support. Were this
objectification's meaning, it could do no work since all voluntary relationships
are rewarding in some way; we do not pick our friends out of the phone book
at random because of a commitment to absolute nondiscrimination and perfect
selfless disinterestedness. We pick our friends on the basis of our enjoyment
of their company, conversation, humor, etc. We get something out of volun-
tary relationships or we would not be in them.
To repeat, objectification occurs when the actor (the sexual subject) treats
another as a thing or sexual object rather than as the person she or he actually
is. In most sexual encounters, even the most objectifying, the object is not
literally regarded as a "thing," i.e., a non-person. The sexual actor would not
be as well satisfied with a blow-up plastic doll. It is important that the object
be a person, but not her own or his own independent autonomous person.
Instead, the object is a projection of the sexual actor's desires, wishes, and
fantasies onto another, so that the other (the object) is no longer an actual
person but only that person imagined by the sexual agent (the subject).
Not all sexual encounters are objectifying in this sense. In non-
objectifying encounters, both participants see the other as the individual she or
he is and the encounter affirms their actual personhood as well as remains
consistent with the feelings, needs, and desires of both. Non-objectifying en-
counters are likely to occur when people know each other and their encounter
is neither commercial nor involves rigid scripts.
I do not mean to suggest that any love or enjoyment of or pleasure in a
partner's body is necessarily objectifying. One can, I believe, give and receive
or copulation is therefore a strategic mistake).
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love physically without treating one's lover as someone she is not. And one
can appreciate another's body without denying their actual personhood and
regarding her or him as primarily a trophy. Indeed, one's love for another
person is likely to affect and heighten one's appreciation for the real physical
beauty of the beloved's body. We never (rarely?) love the beloved as though
she were only a mind or soul.
Non-objectifying encounters are, in themselves, moral goods and part of
what many want in a fulfilling life as a human person.24 The morality of an
objectifying sexual encounter depends on whether the objectifying sexuality is
autonomy-denying or autonomy-respecting. Let me explain.
Autonomy-respectful (objectifying) encounters are consistent with the
object's desires and wishes. For example, both a brief sexual encounter be-
tween strangers who interact for a short period of time and a rigidly scripted
S&M scenario are likely to be objectifying in that the object is not seen as the
person she or he is but as a projection of some kind. In both situations, how-
ever, this reality may be entirely consistent with the object's wishes and there-
fore autonomy-respecting.
In contrast, autonomy-denying encounters are inconsistent with the
object's desires in that the object would prefer to skip the sexual encounter
were it possible to do so cost-free. Autonomy-denying sexuality includes not
only rape, but also sexual harassment on the job or at school and other forms
of unwanted sex, i.e., sex inconsistent with what the object would choose were
there no costs associated with saying an effective "no."
1. Autonomy-Denying Encounters
By unwanted consensual sex I mean sex that one participant would rather
avoid than experience. I do not mean necessarily to include every encounter in
which one partner is more interested in sexual intimacy than the other at the
beginning of the encounter. Such an encounter might or might not be
autonomy-denying unwanted sex, depending on whether one of the participants
would prefer to skip the encounter.
Unwanted consensual sex is likely to be dangerous to the personhood of
the uninterested participant, particularly when endured repeatedly, not just on
one night but night after night. When a man assumes that what he wants is
what she wants (much pornography insists that women desperately want to be
taken and abused in the way the pornography does), the sex is likely to be
autonomy-denying for the real woman, whose feelings and experiences are
irrelevant to what takes place. Most commercial sex would be in this category
since generally the sex worker would not engage in the sexual activity but for
the money.
In a recent essay, Robin West identifies four injuries to women's sense of
selfhood when they allow their bodies to be used by men in autonomy-denying
but consensual sex: (1) injury to their capacity for self assertion, for connect-
24. They may, however, pose moral problems because of particular circumstances, such as
breach of a committed monogamous relationship.
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ing their feelings and experiences into actions to increase their pleasure or
decrease their pain; (2) injury to their sense of themselves as subjects, becom-
ing instead giving selves (defined by others needs and wants) rather than
beings with their own legitimate needs and wants; (3) injury to their sense of
autonomy; and (4) injury to their sense of integrity when they lie and say that
they desired and enjoyed the experience."
We all endure, of course, many injuries along these lines in other con-
texts. For example, at work one might be obligated to be nice or even deferen-
tial to a powerful person who is actually a fool or worse. Denying the reality
of one's bodily desires (or lack thereof) is, however, often likely to be far
more damaging. A person who regards her own bodily experiences as irrele-
vant to whether she should consent to another's use of her body for his sexual
pleasure is more likely to internalize her own relative worthlessness (why else
would her feelings be irrelevant to his use of her body) than the wage worker
who consciously chooses to be obsequious to a boss.
The harm of repeatedly agreeing to such sex is likely to be exacerbated
for women by our culture's attitude toward women's sexuality and women
who have sex. The harm of unwanted consensual sex is likely to be far worse
for a woman in this position than for a man (e.g., a female versus a male
prostitute) because our culture tends to regard women as degraded by sex, a
feeling that is partcularly likely to be internalized by a woman who agrees to
another's use of her body for sexual activity she would rather skip (were it
cost-free effectively to say no). Women in abusive relationships often internal-
ize a sense that they are worthless when their partners use sexual and verbal
abuse. For example, abusers routinely call their sexual partners "whores" or
worse.
Studies of girls involved in sports support my belief that for a girl or a
woman in our culture, her sense of self-esteem and self-worth is likely to be
profoundly affected by her bodily experiences and the extent to which they
reflect her own agency. These studies consistently report that girls who play
team sports are more likely to avoid teenage pregnancy, graduate from high
25. In a recent essay, Robin West described these four harms:
First, they may sustain injuries to their capacities for self-assertion: the "psychic connec-
tion," so to speak, between pleasure, desire, motivation, and action is weakened or sev-
ered. Acting on the basis of our own felt pleasures and pains is an important component
of forging our own way in the world--f "asserting" our "selves." Consenting to
unpleasurable sex-acting in spite of displeasure-threatens that means of self assertion.
Second, women who consent to undesired sex may injure their sense of self-possession.
When we consent to undesired penetration of our physical bodies we have in a quite lit-
eral way constituted ourselves as what I have elsewhere called "giving selves"---selves
who cannot be violated, because they have been defined as (and define themselves as)
being "for others." Our bodies to that extent no longer belong to ourselves. Third, when
women consent to undesired and unpleasurable sex because of their felt or actual
dependency upon a partner's affection or economic status, they injure their sense of
autonomy: they have thereby neglected to take whatever steps would be requisite to
achieving the self-sustenance necessary to their independence. And fourth, to the extent
that these unpleasurable and undesired sexual acts are followed by contrary to fact
claims that they enjoyed the whole thing-what might be called "hedonic lies"---women
who engage in them do considerable damage to their sense of integrity.
Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, 94 AM. PHIL. ASS'N NEWSLETrERs 52, 53 (1995).
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school, have higher levels of self-esteem, avoid abusive relationships, and be
healthier.16 These studies suggest that feeling that one is in control with re-
spect to one's own body is extremely important to the well-being of girls and
women in our culture.
2. Autonomy-Respecting Encounters
Objectification respectful of autonomy is not troubling in the same way
and may be entirely moral. Autonomy-respecting objectification occurs when a
person treats another as an object or thing but yet in a manner consistent with
the object's own wishes and desires. Such objectification can take a number of
forms. For example, autonomy-respecting objectification occurs when the
subject sees the other merely as "body parts" for the subject's use because the
object's desires are consistent with the subject's own. As a collection of useful
body parts, the other might be fungible with similar objects, and treated as an
object in the sense of fungibility, though the two meet with a common goal.
Similarly, controlled, consensual S&M can be objectifying because of the
script, which requires certain roles and forms of interaction based on those
roles. Such interaction is objectifying in that one actor treats the other, not as
the actual human being she is but as a mental abstraction, a fantasy, a role.
Such sex may, of course, be mutually desired and consistent with and respect-
ful of the autonomy of each.
In contrast, as noted earlier, non-objectifying sex is both mutually desired
and entirely consistent with the actual personhood of the partner, affirming the
partner as the person she is. I do not know whether non-objectifying sexual
interactions are necessarily morally problematic. It may be that for some peo-
ple, their best and most fulfilling life would include some objectifying sex or
only objectifying sex. My point is only that autonomy-denying sexuality is
morally problematic because of the harm it causes the sexual object, whereas
autonomy-respecting objectification and non-objectifying sexuality are not
inherently troubling on a moral level for this reason.
The three categories I have described are not firm and distinct. Partici-
pants in the same sexual encounter may have different understandings of what
kind of encounter occurred and may even be unsure how to classify an en-
counter. To the extent that women define themselves as "giving,"--as wanting
to give that which would otherwise be taken from them 2"-women will often
be unable to identify sex as wanted or unwanted because those concepts have
no meaning. In addition, each of these kinds of sexual interaction shades into
the others; the lines between them are not clear or sharp. These concerns do
26. See Joanne Korth, Survey: Image, Support Still Lag, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23,
1994, at 2C; Nancy Lieberman-Cline, Sports Can Teach Women to Compete in the Workplace,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, June 29, 1995, at 4B; Andrea Martin, As You Were Saying; Sports Help
Girls Grow Strong, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 4, 1996, at 26; Wendy Parker, Women's Notebook;
Just Overdo It: Sales Pitch to Girls Cites Sports' Real, Mythical Benefits, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 9, 1995, at 12D; Elizabeth Weil, Good Sports; It's Seen as an Offensive Move Against Self-
Esteem Problems, Depression and Drug Abuse, Great Reasons, the Experts Say, to Team Up Girls
and Athletics, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1996, at El.
27. West, supra note 10, at 96-97.
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not affect my analysis because I do not suggest that we adopt laws or policies
creating categories along these lines. My use of these categories, as will be
seen below, is quite limited.
B. Mapping Sexuality
Sexuality can be viewed as a continuum. At one end is rape, an extreme
form of autonomy-denying sex, during which the sexual actor is wholly indif-
ferent not only to the actual subjective desires and pleasures of the object but
even to the object's expressed desires. Regardless of what the subject feels
and says, the rapist is likely to see her only as a projection of his own desire,
whether it be that she really does or does not want "it." Unwanted sex, sex
which one would rather skip than endure, could one do so without costs,
comes next, then autonomy-respecting objectifying sex, and at the other
extreme, non-objectifying sex.
Place sex/sexual orientation groups (heterosexual men, heterosexual wom-
en, bisexual men, bisexual women, gay men, and lesbian women) along this
continuum. Heterosexual men are the group responsible for most autonomy-
denying sex in the United States today. Rape is the clearest evidence of such a
sexuality. And it is overwhelmingly men who rape, and they overwhelmingly
rape women. In the recent National Health and Social Life sex survey
(NHSLS), the authors report that whereas 21.6% of women report having been
forced to do something sexual by a man, 0.3% women report having been
forced by a woman, 1.3% of men report being forced by a woman, and 1.9%
of men report being forced by a man. 8 This is consistent with anecdotal re-
ports that, though some gay men are (like other men) quite promiscuous in
certain settings (such as bathhouses or the Ramble in Central Park), treating
strangers as sexual objects fungible one with the other, they are generally
respectful of each other's autonomy, hence the relatively low number of com-
plaints of rape on gay cruising grounds.29
Rape is not unheard of in the gay community. But it is far less common
than among heterosexuals. Indeed, the form of homosexual rape that comes
most readily to mind, prison rape, is also in most instances a "heterosexual"
male phenomenon in that the rapist is someone who, when out of prison, re-
gards himself and acts as a heterosexual male.
The more widespread form of autonomy-denying objectification-having
sex with someone who does not want it and whose feelings and desires are
irrelevant to the encounter-is also common for heterosexual men. Many
women in heterosexual relationships speak of having unwanted sex because it
is their obligation or duty or to avoid a partner's anger or resentment or be-
cause saying no is awkward or difficult." Often, heterosexual women want a
28. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (1994) (Table 9.7).
29. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 129-218
(1992).
30. See LILLIAN B. RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 148-53
(1976) [hereinafter RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN] (relating women's feelings about sex using a study
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cuddle or a hug but engage in genital sex to get it.3' Many women in het-
erosexual relationships fake orgasms.32 Many ordinary heterosexual women
have lots of unwanted sex. The phenomenon of unwanted sex does not seem
as widespread among lesbians and gay men, though there is doubtless some
unwanted sex in some of these relationships, particularly when economic and
other power differentials exist. But there are a number of reasons to think that
unwanted sex should occur less often than in heterosexual relationships.
Unwanted sex may be particularly low in lesbian relationships because
neither partner has been raised with a male sense of entitlement to sex from a
partner. For example, one study, describing a lesbian couple in which one
partner desired more genital sex than the other, reports that Sally, the person
who wanted more sex, said that "now I'm more discreet. I edit how much I
ask in order not to get rejected as much. Also, she sometimes says no, but
more often than not she says yes. But then I don't ask all the time."33 The
authors conclude: "If Sally were a traditional heterosexual man, she would not
hesitate to ask, because it would be both her right and her duty to do so. Nor
would she be so hurt when refused."34 Indeed, the problem many lesbians
discuss is not unwanted sex but the opposite: "bed death," i.e., too little sex
once the relationship is no longer novel. Most "experts" regard "bed death" as
related to the fact that both partners are women, raised in a culture in which
they are not expected to be sexual agents, and therefore uncomfortable initiat-
ing sex once the initial passion has diminished. Thus, the problem for lesbians
is likely to be too little sex (partners experiencing bed death do not tend to be
happy celibates), rather than unwanted sex.
of working class marriages). Rubin reports that
[o]nce in a while, a woman says: "I tell him straight I'm not in the mood, and he under-
stands." Mostly, however, women say: "I don't use excuses like headaches and things
like that. If my husband wants me, I'm his wife, and I do what he wants. It's my re-
sponsibility to give it to him when he needs it."
Id.; see also LILIAN B. RUBIN, EROTIC WARS: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION
72-73, 75, 93-95, 98-108, 110-12 (1990) [hereinafter RUBIN, EROTIC WARS]. Rubin also told the
story of a 39-year-old woman who had slept with a number of men while looking for a permanent
relationship and expressed regret:
Sex is supposed to mean something, and not just be this transitory activity. Most of the
time I wasn't really doing what I wanted to do. I'd have sex with someone because it
seemed like it was easier to go through with it and do it than it was to say no and get
out of the situation. Do you know what it feels like to wake up to some stranger from
the night before and think: "Oh God, why? What am I doing here?" The guy's happy,
he feels like a conqueror, and you feel humiliated because you know you'll probably
never hear from him.
Id. at 110.
31. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 198 (telling the story of a wife who reports
that she initiates sex most of the time "because I am not always serious"). She explained that
"sometimes I just want to cuddle or kiss and I don't always mean, 'Keep going'..... Sometimes
he thinks I am initiating that and I am not. I just want to be close." Id.; see also RUBIN, EROTIC
WARS, supra note 30, at 73 (the gratification many teenage girls find in casual sex is "being
touched, held and hugged" and not orgasmic).
32. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 28, at 116 (Table 3.7) (43.5% of men report that their
partner always had an orgasm, though only 28.6% of women reported always having an orgasm).
Compare the quite similar estimates when 75% of men reported that they always had an orgasm
and 78% of women reported that their partner always had an orgasm. Id.
33. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 214.
34. Id. at 214-15.
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Also, women in lesbian relationships, like women in heterosexual relation-
ships, "prize nongenital physical contact-cuddling, touching, hugging" and
lesbians "are much more likely to consider these activities as ends in them-
selves, rather than as foreplay leading to genital sex. '35 Because both partners
in a lesbian relationship are likely to value non-genital touching as an end in
itself (rather than as always leading to genital sex), both are less likely (than
most men) to assume that any physical contact is an attempt to initiate genital
sex. This too may result in less unwanted sex.
For both lesbians and gay men, neither partner begins a relationship with
the understanding that because she and only she (or he and only he) has a
penis, sex is defined by and centered on his or her orgasms, nor does only one
partner have the advantage of a male wage while the other has the disadvan-
tage of being expected to be the primary caretaker or any of the other social
differences discussed in the first section of this essay. And since both are
women or men, one does not have the disadvantage vis-A-vis the other of
thinking that her sexuality is primarily for the pleasure of her (male) partner
rather than herself, a lesson drummed continuously into women by our culture.
Also, because both are men or women, they may be more likely to desire sex
at similar frequencies or for similar amounts of time and under similar circum-
stances.
To be sure, other differentials may be present and important in terms of
power dynamics in a particular relationship: age, wealth, athleticism, physical
endowments, or beauty-so that sex is primarily about satisfying the desires
and needs of the dominant partner (autonomy-denying) rather than mutually
desired and fulfilling. But in heterosexual relationships, there are more
socially-constructed power differentials systematically favoring one partner
than there are in same-sex relationships, as noted in the first section of this
essay.
Also, the double standard does not pose the problem for lesbians and gay
men that it does for women in heterosexual relationships, since both partici-
pants are of the same sex. Neither partner in a lesbian or gay relationship is as
likely as a heterosexual woman to be inhibited by the fear that their partner
will have a double standard regarding women who are too active or who initi-
ate too much as "bad," or usurping male prerogatives.36 This can be a major
problem for women's development as sexual agents, since it is difficult to
keep oneself in check one instant and to let go the next.
I have not been able to find any lesbian or gay discussions of the problem
of unwanted, autonomy-denying sex, though there are many books on lesbian
and gay sex and heterosexual women routinely describe such sex.37 I suspect,
therefore, that this is less of a problem for lesbians and gay men than for
heterosexual women, for the reasons just given. There is evidence of unwanted
35. Id. at 197.
36. For a discussion of male resentment of women who initiate too much or are specific
about their sexual desires, and women's resulting reluctance, see id. at 209-14; RUBIN, WORLDS
OF PAIN, supra note 30, at 142-44.
37. See supra notes 30-32.
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same-sex sexual harassment, particularly in employment settings, and sexual
harassment is the expression of an autonomy-denying sexuality. But even in
that context, most sexual harassment on the job is by heterosexual men.
In sum, of the three forms of autonomy-denying sexuality described
here-rape, sexual harassment on-the-job, and other unwanted sex-rape is
overwhelmingly a heterosexual male phenomenon, as is sexual harassment at
work." Unwanted sex also seems primarily a heterosexual male phenomenon,
though it doubtless occurs in all sorts of relationships.
In light of this reality, the claim of many heterosexuals to "deserve" pref-
erential treatment by the state in marriage because of their moral superiority
over same-sex couples is unwarranted, since such encounters are least likely to
be autonomy-respecting and hence good for the human personhood of both
participants. Talking about the morality of various kinds of sexual encounters
is, I think, necessary if the goodness of many lesbian and gay relationships is
to become visible and ultimately entitled to full legitimation by the state in
marriage.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have suggested that the progressive potential of the New
Private Law is limited. The New Private Law's willingness to enforce lesbian
and gay cohabitation contracts (a progressive change) is more than offset by
the increased willingness to enforce pre-marital and marital contracts for het-
erosexuals (a regressive change). I have also argued that legal recognition and
social respect for lesbian and gay relationships requires talking about what is
good and bad about sexual relationships.
In the final section of the paper, I suggested that the morality of sexual
encounters turns, not on the sex of participants, but on whether the encounter
is autonomy-respecting or autonomy-denying. I argued that autonomy-denying
sex includes not just rape and sexual harassment at work but also unwanted
sex, i.e., sex a participant would rather avoid than live through were it more
cost-effective to say "no." Autonomy-denying sex is primarily a heterosexual
male phenomenon. Demonizing all same-sex relationships and idealizing het-
erosexual relationships-including unwanted sex routinely experienced by
many ordinary women in marriage-is one way in which we fail even to iden-
tify immoral sex as such. Ultimately, we should work for legal rules and so-
cial policies that would minimize immoral, autonomy-denying sexual relation-
ships and give legal recognition and social respect to moral sexual relation-
ships.39 We must, therefore, address what is good and bad about sexual rela-
tionships whether heterosexual, gay, or lesbian.
38. The relatively low rates of same-sex sexual harassment on the job may, of course, be the
result of taboos against same-sex sexuality (and the subsequent closeting) rather than reflecting a
difference in the extent of objectification.
39. I am not suggesting that we should criminalize autonomy-denying objectification or that
we should adopt any rules using as legal categories the distinctions I have drawn in this paper
between autonomy-denying objectifying sex, autonomy-respectful objectifying sex, and non-
objectifying sex. We might, however, design rules to minimize autonomy-denying sex in other
ways, such as by giving homemakers and caretakers better economic protections at divorce.
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